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Abstract
Through a cross-sectional research design, this study examined power struggles in 
Burunge Wildlife Management Area (WMA) in Tanzania. Four out of ten villages com-
prising the WMA were purposively selected, and data were collected via focus group 
discussions, key informant interviews, questionnaires to household heads, and a litera-
ture review. Results showed that the central government, investors and non-government 
organisations held institutional and strategic powers, while the democratically elected 
Village Councils held structural powers and lost most of their pre-WMA institutional 
powers to a legally required new institution, the Authorised Association. Therefore, 
Village Councils lost influence on strategic, institutional and management decisions per-
tinent to the WMA and their constituencies’ livelihoods. Accordingly, Burunge WMA de-
democratised wildlife management by eroding the relevance of Village Councils to their 
constituencies. The study also found power struggles over revenues, land management 
and access to resources among the stakeholders, mainly due to a divergence of interests. 
However, there was no conflict management mechanism in place. Hence, we recommend 
that the institutional powers to establish, govern and dissolve WMAs should go back to 
Village Councils. The purpose is to establish economic incentive structures that promote 
(i) wildlife conservation, (ii) an equitable distribution of associated costs and benefits 
between Village Councils forming WMAs and (iii) an equitable distribution of costs and 
benefits between WMAs and higher levels of government as well as international con-
servation NGOs.
Keywords: wildlife management areas, power struggles, actors, resource conflicts
© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1. Introduction
‘Power’ in the context of natural resource management has no single universally accepted 
definition. For instance, some scholars characterise power as the relationship between 
people [1], while others relate it to coercion, constraint, consent, social relationship and 
interaction [2]. However, power occurs in various forms including structural, strategic 
and institutional [3–5]. Structural power, or domination, is asymmetrical, hierarchical, 
hard to challenge and difficult to reverse [3]. The subordinate actors in structural power 
arrangements have little room for manoeuvre because their margin of liberty is extremely 
limited [5]. Strategic power involves structuring possible fields of action of others, and it 
is expressed through daily interactions between individuals and groups [3]. Accordingly, 
strategic power has many expressions, including economic ability, rational and ideological 
argumentation or manipulation [4]. Officialised institutional power is systematised, regu-
lated and involves mandates that are legally defined [3, 5].
Furthermore, power is often exercised through multiple, intertwined institutions1 following 
what is socially possible or acceptable [5]. Power analysis must involve observation of actors 
in decision-making [2, 3, 5, 6]. Therefore, stakeholders’ power can be understood as the extent 
to which they can persuade or coerce others to accept decisions and follow certain courses of 
action [7, 8]. This may also involve actors resisting the management actions over resources. 
Counterpower such as foot-dragging occurs in situations where the less powerful try to express 
their concerns. For example, Scott [9] revealed that in developing countries, communities 
rarely choose open confrontations against onerous new laws but instead resort to more subtle 
actions of everyday resistance including foot-dragging and hidden non-compliance, that is, by 
using the weapons of the weak. When this happens, it is usually a sign of great desperation [9].
In Tanzania, power struggles among actors over decision-making related to wildlife manage-
ment have lasted for decades [10]. For example, the lucrative nature of wildlife resources has 
created strong incentives and vested interests for the central government and the associated 
bureaucracy to maintain control over the resource [11]. As a result, institutional reforms or 
legal adjustments officially intended to enhance local communities’ rights to benefit from 
wildlife have often been circumscribed to reassert the state’s ultimate power in matters of 
wildlife governance [8]. Over time, these reforms and legislative adjustments have produced 
asymmetrical power relations in the way decisions are made about wildlife resources and 
how benefits from wildlife are shared among the actors (ibid.).
The United Republic of Tanzania (URT) has decentralised wildlife management through the 
introduction of Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) [12]. The Wildlife Policy of Tanzania 
defines WMAs as a new category of protected areas for community-based wildlife management. 
WMAs can be established when a group of Village Councils agree to set aside adjacent parts 
of their respective village lands to form a WMA [12]. However, the process that leads to a fully 
functioning WMA is long and bureaucratic. It begins with the formation of a community-based 
1For the purpose of this study, institutions are defined as rules including policies, legislations, regulations, guidelines, 
bylaws, constitution and other long established patterns of conduct or customs through which people interact with one 
another.
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organisation among the involved villages, which among others must prepare a draft so-named 
Management Zone Plan for the WMA area. When the Director of the Wildlife Division endorses 
the Management Zone Plan, the community-based organisation is granted wildlife user rights 
and becomes a legally recognised institution, called an Authorised Association2, which is autho-
rised to manage its WMA [13]. With decentralisation by devolution as envisioned in the 1998 
Wildlife Policy [12], the Authorised Association is expected to be accountable to the local commu-
nities. However, empirical evidence has revealed that Authorised Associations are more account-
able to the central government ([14, 15], see also below). This contradicts Ribot’s definition of 
devolution, which ‘involves transfers of power to elected local authorities and enables local 
people to make decisions for themselves through their representative local authorities’ [9, 16].
Before the introduction of WMAs, other functionally protected areas included National Parks 
and Game Reserves where no human settlement is allowed and Game Controlled Areas as well 
as the Ngorongoro Conservation Area—where settlement is allowed albeit under tight regula-
tion [17]. National parks are managed by the Tanzania National Park Authority (TANAPA); 
game reserves and game controlled areas are managed by the Tanzania Wildlife Management 
Authority (TAWA); and WMAs are managed by communities through Authorised Associations, 
which, except for the secretary and trustee of each Authorised Association, are democratically 
elected community-based organisations. Therefore, WMAs are a form of common property 
regimes (CPR), whereby communities are expected to sustainably manage and benefit from 
wildlife [18, 19]. However, decentralisation usually threatens some actors’ powers and inter-
ests. As a result, official power transfers from the central government to local actors are often 
resisted overtly and covertly by different actors [20].
Currently, Tanzania has 38 WMAs at different stages of development [21]. Burunge WMA 
was among the first nine pilot WMAs in Tanzania. It was launched in 2003 and granted official 
status in 2006 [22, 23]. Burunge WMA has great significance to Tanzania’s protected area net-
work given its function as a wildlife corridor linking Tarangire National Park, Lake Manyara 
National Park and Ngorongoro Conservation Area [22, 23]. The importance of Burunge WMA 
has attracted numerous actors to participate in its management. Divergent roles, interests and 
expectations of these actors are, however, major causes of power struggles, which unfortu-
nately is not unique. For example, Shilereyo [24] reported a situation where local people had 
no power to influence management decisions in a WMA, while Manyika et al. [25] reported 
power struggles over forest governance. Also, Bluwstein et al. [14] showed how the process 
of rule-making and rule-changing in WMAs generated power struggles. However, analyses 
addressing issues of interests, power disparity and power struggles among the actors in 
community-based conservation are relatively few. Thus, our understanding of the outcomes 
including the management of such power struggles is inadequate.
This study examines power struggles among the key actors in Burunge WMA, specifically 
by attempting to answer the following questions: who are the actors and what are their roles 
and interests in the management of Burunge WMA? What powers (structural, strategic and 
institutional) do these actors possess and how do they affect the management of the WMA? 
2Authorised Association means ‘a community based organisation, whose primary objective is to conserve wildlife 
resources for the benefit of local community members ordinarily residing in that particular area’ (URT, 2012:5).
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How do these powers determine the outcome of struggles among the actors? And how are 
these power struggle conflicts managed?
1.1. Theoretical framework
Drawing on Raik et al. [2], Nuijten [3], Kajembe et al. [5] and Manyika et al. [25], this study 
focuses on identifying actors including their roles, interests and powers to understand power 
struggles and their outcomes in natural resource governance. The emergence of conflicts is 
an important indicator of power struggles among actors [2, 25]. In this study, power means 
the relationship among the actors, while power struggle denotes a negative situation in the 
course of decision-making where certain actors at the expense of other legitimate actors push 
forward their interests in the management of WMAs. Also, the study draws on common prop-
erty theory dealing with the governance of common pool resources. The theory is expounded 
by the principles of subtractability/rivalry (that one person’s resource use diminishes what is 
available for others) and excludability (that people are divided into ‘insiders’ who have rights 
to a defined resource and ‘outsiders’ who do not have rights) [19, 26].
2. Methodology
2.1. Description of the study area
The study was carried out in Burunge WMA located in Babati District in Northern Tanzania 
(Figure 1). The H-shaped WMA was established in 2003 and covers about 283 km2. It is formed 
among 10 villages, namely Mwada, Sangaiwe, Ngoley, Vilima Vitatu, Kakoi, Olasit, Manyara, 
Magara, Maweni and Minjingu. The residents in these villages practice livestock keeping and 
small-scale farming as their main economic activities. Their main food crops are maize, beans, 
bananas, paddy rice, potatoes and millets. Sesame is the major cash crop. The area experi-
ences a bimodal rainfall: short rains from May to June and long rains between November and 
January. The annual rainfall ranges between 400 and 500 mm, while the temperature ranges 
between 18 and 33°C [27, 28].
2.2. Research design and data collection methods
The research was carried out between 2014 and 2016 using a cross-sectional design. Four vil-
lages, Mwada, Vilima Vitatu, Minjingu and Kakoi, were purposely selected for this study. The 
main criterion for selection of the study villages was residents’ level of acceptance of Burunge 
WMA and associated arrangements of access to resources (i.e., satisfied or dissatisfied). For 
example, preliminary survey results showed that Mwada villagers were fairly satisfied with 
the WMA, while villagers in Minjingu, Vilima Vitatu and Kakoi (a relatively newly formed 
village separated from Minjingu) were dissatisfied and wanted to withdraw from the WMA.
For triangulation purposes, the study applied several methods of data collection including 
focus group discussions, key informant interviews and a questionnaire. Focus group discus-
sions were conducted with Village Council members, with youths, women and senior men from 
each village. Selection for the focus group discussions was conducted so that each group had 
Wildlife Management - Failures, Successes and Prospects106
different interests, positions and roles in the management of natural resources [29]. Key infor-
mant interviews were conducted up to the point at which no new information was obtained, 
that is, the data saturation point [30]. Informants involved were respondents who had specific 
knowledge about Burunge WMA including the village chairpersons, senior men and women, 
the Burunge Authorised Association and Babati District and Wildlife Division officials.
Focus group discussions and key informant interviews sought to identify powers held by the 
key actors and uncover emerging struggles originating from these power differences. The 
powers of different actors in the WMA were identified through a stakeholder analysis that 
uncovered stakeholders with vested interests in the current situation and stakeholders who 
were likely to be affected, either positively or negatively, in case conditions change or remain 
the same. The questionnaire survey involved respondents drawn randomly from the village 
registers (n = 140 households in total) [31]. The questionnaire had both closed-ended and open-
ended questions. Along with key informant interviews and focus group discussions, the ques-
tionnaire survey was used to assess the existing resource use conflicts. Secondary data, mainly 
law texts that related to actors, powers of actors, power struggles and conflicts were reviewed.
2.3. Data analysis
Content analysis was used to analyse data related to the institutional and different categories 
of power possessed by different actors. In this case, all qualitative data from focus group 
Figure 1. Map of the study area. Source: [15].
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discussions, the questionnaire and key informant interviews were categorised into related 
themes [32]. Underlying themes in the categories of words were identified, explained, clari-
fied and interpreted [33].
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Key actors in the management of the WMA
The study revealed various actors with different roles and interests in the WMA (Table 1). 
The interests were both overlapping and divergent. However, all actors supported the objec-
tive of wildlife conservation. The local communities viewed conservation as an opportunity 
to improve their livelihoods, while the central government, through the Wildlife Division, 
enjoyed the expansion of conservation territory as well as improved revenue collection 
Actor Roles Interests
Village Assembly Collective decision-making such 
as approving the size of land to be 
allocated for WMA establishment.
Conservation of wildlife; accruing 
benefits from the WMA and 
improvement of livelihoods.
Village Councils Representing villagers in all matters 
about the villagers’ well-being.
Protecting their fellow villagers’ rights 
and promoting their interests.
Authorised Association Managing the WMA on behalf of the 
villagers.
Act as a power broker between the 
villagers and the central government 
agencies and local government.
Ensuring the conservation of wildlife and 
that associated benefits are realised at 
WMA level.
District Council Oversee management of the WMA. Making sure wildlife is conserved. 
Generating benefits from the WMA.
Wildlife Division Making rules for WMA 
management.
Increasing the area of protected 
landscapes including wildlife corridors 
where most WMAs are located.
Collecting revenues from tourism 
investments in the WMA.
Non-Governmental Organisations 
(World Wildlife Fund for Nature, 
African Wildlife Foundation)
Facilitating WMA establishment. Conserving wildlife and ensuring 
the increase of protected landscapes 
including wildlife corridors between 
otherwise protected areas.
Investors (Maramboi and Burunge 
tented camps)
Entering into contracts with the 
Authorised Association to undertake 
business ventures in the gazetted 
WMA.
Generating profits through wildlife 
conservation.
Tanzania National Parks Authority 
(TANAPA)
Conserving Wildlife Ensuring that Burunge WMA acts as a 
buffer zone and corridor.
Source: field data.
Table 1. Actors, their roles and interests in Burunge WMA.
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because the Wildlife Division, by law, has substituted the Village Councils’ role as a revenue 
collector from tourism businesses within the WMA (see below).
The Wildlife Division has three major roles: policy formulation, regulation and coordination. 
Until recently when Tanzania Wildlife Management Authority was established by govern-
ment order, the Wildlife Division was responsible for overseeing the management of wildlife 
outside national parks and the Ngorongoro Conservation Area. However, since the formation 
of WMAs was based on the promise of enabling people to manage wildlife on their lands and 
benefit from this resource, the role of revenue collection assumed by the Wildlife Division 
contradicted expectations of the local communities, whom government officials during the 
sensitization process verbally promised full control over the WMA and a say over the rev-
enues and other benefits. By assuming the role of revenue collection, our respondents felt that 
the Wildlife Division had grabbed an intended power of the Authorised Association—defined 
in the WMA Regulations as ‘a community-based organisation, whose primary objective is to 
conserve wildlife resources for the benefit of local community members ordinarily residing in 
that particular area’ [13].
Besides its conservation role, the Authorised Association is intended to act as a power bro-
ker between the local communities and the central/local government agencies. However, the 
Authorised Association was found mostly to represent the interests of the central govern-
ment. These findings are similar to another study in the area by Kicheleri et al. [15] where 
the Authorised Association was found to be accountable to the central government, quite 
in contradiction to the WMA Regulations, which require Authorised Associations to be 
accountable to the local communities. Accordingly, the interests of the central government 
take precedence over those of the local communities. The Tanzania National Park Authority’s 
(TANAPA’s) interests are that Burunge WMA serves as a buffer zone to and a corridor 
between ‘its’ national parks.
Kajembe et al. [5] contend that in the management of natural resources, triangles of actors 
including state agencies, NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations) and local communities 
are created where power struggles take place. This happened in this case as well where pro-
cedural flaws have clouded the Burunge WMA establishment process during which some 
actors pushed forward their interests without due regard to other actors’ interests or formal 
democratic procedures. For instance, the conflicting interests and power differences among 
communities, donors, the central government and the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) 
negatively affected the AWF’s work with communities in Burunge WMA [15, 34]. Instead of 
acting as a power broker between the central government and local communities, the AWF 
found itself in conflict with the local communities because it sided with representatives of 
the Wildlife Division who allegedly manipulated and misled Village Councils to push for 
their acceptance of the WMA [15]. Accordingly, proper identification of actors, their roles 
and interests from the very beginning of a conservation-through-decentralisation project is 
quite vital. The reason being that this allows other actors and stakeholders to assess the likely 
consequences (for them) when the kind of decentralisation they are asked to support entails a 
transfer of specific bundles of powers from the centre to particular institutions that are more 
or less downwardly accountable [16].
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3.2. Powers of key actors in Burunge WMA
From these results, the key actors, that is, Village Councils, the Authorised Association, District 
and Wildlife Division officials, NGOs and TANAPA, and investors exercised different types of 
powers (Table 2). Essentially, there were three types of powers possessed by these actors. The 
Village Councils had structural power, while investors possessed strategic power. The Authorised 
Association, District Council, TANAPA, NGOs and the Wildlife Division had both institutional 
and strategic powers. The structural power relates to cultural or social positions such as being 
an elder in the society, while strategic power relates to level of education and/or wealth. The 
institutional power relates to positions in the government, organisations or associations [2–4, 6].
The communities that collectively make decisions at the Village Assemblies are represented 
by the Village Councils, that is, the democratically elected Village Governments. Therefore, 
the structural power possessed by the Village Councils is in line with the findings of Kajembe 
et al. [5] who assert that structural power is widespread in traditional societies. This is because 
structural power is associated with social position such as being a household, clan or tribal 
head. It is further associated with a cultural position such as being a traditional healer in a 
village [6]. However, in this context, the village’s liberty to influence the WMA management 
decisions was limited. Structural power cannot override strategic or institutional powers unless 
full discretionary powers are devolved [18]. Therefore, to influence multiple levels of gover-
nance, structural power needs the backing and support of institutional or strategic powers. 
Unfortunately, the exact opposite tends to happen, which increasingly restricts those holding 
structural powers to realms of cultural and religious rather than socio-economic significance.
With democratic decentralisation, it was expected that institutional power over decision-making 
in the WMAs would be shifted to the Village Councils whose members are democratically 
elected and thus downwardly accountable to the local communities. However, contrary to this 
expectation, the Authorised Association, District Council and Wildlife Division have the institu-
tional power to make most decisions regarding the WMA management at the village level. These 
findings suggest that the rights of local communities to exercise institutional power and manage 
the WMA were undermined. Thus, a Village Council’s ability to influence WMA management 
Actor Type of power
Village Councils Structural and institutional
Investors Strategic
Authorised Association Institutional/governmental, strategic
District Council Institutional/governmental, strategic
TANAPA Institutional/governmental, strategic
NGOs Institutional/governmental, strategic
Wildlife Division Institutional/governmental, strategic
Source: field data.
Table 2. Actors’ powers to influence Burunge WMA management decisions.
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decisions was limited by the institutional setup of the WMA. This may be associated with the 
lack of enforcement of rules that are centrally enacted on the ground together with central gov-
ernment interests to re-centralise (while decentralising) WMA management. In support of this 
argument, Kicheleri et al. [15] found that WMA related meetings were not conducted in the 
villages to communicate WMA management performance and progress.
The WMA Regulations Section 17 describes the responsibilities of the Village Council in 
the management of Wildlife Management Areas [13]. Section 17 (g) states that the Village 
Council shall ‘monitor the activities of the Authorised Association and report to the Village 
Assembly and District Council’. Section 17 (i) states that the Village Council shall ‘ensure that 
the Authorised Association implements sectoral policies while entering into agreements on 
the management of a Wildlife Management Area’. Contrary to these statements, however, the 
WMA Regulations’ Section 24 excludes Village Councils as members of the District Natural 
Resources Advisory Board (DNRAB) [13]. We argue that excluding Village Councils from this 
Board attenuates their ability to influence Authorised Associations’ governance of WMAs.
Investors hold strategic power, which gives them access to investment opportunities in the 
WMA. Mbeyale [4] identifies wealth among the sources of strategic power, whereas Kelly [35] 
sees the market value of tourism business as high and, therefore, a key area of investment by 
actors with strategic power. Essentially, tourism investors want to stay in the market; hence, 
they employ their strategic powers to stay in business and pay taxes to the Wildlife Division 
rather than to Village Governments as they did before the WMA was established. Hence, 
tourism investors often find themselves hijacked in a struggle over tourism-based revenues 
between the central government and Village Councils.
The NGOs, namely the AWF and the World Wide Fund (WWF) for nature both held insti-
tutional as well as strategic powers. In the establishment of WMAs, NGOs are claimed to 
have used their position to manipulate local communities to accept WMAs [15]. Comparable 
observations are apparent for REDD+ projects in Tanzania where financial resources were 
used to earn NGOs higher bargaining power [25]. Similarly, instead of facilitating the process 
of establishing Burunge WMA through meaningful public participation, the AWF alienated 
local communities by favouring interests of the central government and donors in expanding 
the area for nature conservation [34].
3.3. Power struggles in Burunge WMA
3.3.1. Struggles over revenues from the WMA investments
In the WMA, benefits stem from non-consumptive utilisation such as tourist lodges, photo-
graphic tourism and consumptive tourist hunting. When Burunge WMA initiated operations 
in 2006, the Authorised Association collected and distributed non-consumptive utilisation 
revenues from tourist investors among Village Councils. That practice changed in 2012 when 
the Wildlife Division took over the role as revenue collector from the Authorised Association. 
This change emerged following the release of the Non-Consumptive Wildlife Utilisation 
Regulations of 2008 (revised 2016) in which Section 16 (3) states that ‘the Director shall collect 
the fees prescribed under these Regulations on behalf of the Authorised Association’ [36]. 
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According to one of the Wildlife Division officials, this change was instituted after learning 
that the Authorised Associations had inadequate capacity to collect the revenues. Allegedly, 
this deficiency resulted in minimal revenue collection from investors. These observations are 
in line with those of Ribot et al. [20] on how governments justify re-centralisation control over 
revenue streams from community-based programmes. Whether the alleged poor capacity of 
the Authorised Association to collect revenue is true or not, an effective community-based pro-
gramme must include fiscal devolution, otherwise, the discretionary powers of locally elected 
leaders become irrelevant to their constituency’s livelihoods [16]. The changes in revenue col-
lection also provoked complaints from the Village Councils who claimed that their share of 
revenue had decreased, which indeed was the case from 2011/12 to 2012/13, c.f. Table 3.
However, the most important messages from and related to Table 3 are that: (i) it was difficult 
to get access to the data, which is held at the Authorised Association’s office, (ii) in most years, 
the Authorised Association seemed to accumulate substantially larger amounts of cash from 
the WMA than what any Village Council received and (iii) during Burunge WMA’s 12-year 
history, the Authorised Association appears to have accumulated a surplus of more than TZS 
833 million or on average just above TZS 69 million per year, which is more than three times 
the average annual amount received by the individual villages. Accordingly, the first author 
attempted to access the Authorised Association’s audited accounts to verify its bank balance, 
but that was promptly stopped. Her subsequent requests to access the books of the Authorised 
Association were categorically denied.
After 2012/13, when the central government had re-centralised WMA revenue collection, offi-
cial revenues going to the Village Councils picked up. Although positive in a narrow sense, 
this fiscal re-centralisation is problematic, c.f. above. Further, our respondents generally agreed 
that the Authorised Association’s capacity to govern the WMA and associated revenue flows 
needs improvement as does public access to scrutinise the Authorised Association’s accounts.
The re-centralisation of WMA revenue governance is evident in the WMA Regulations and 
associated legislation, which specify how revenues from a WMA must be shared. The Non-
Consumptive Wildlife Utilisation Regulations Section 19 (b) stipulates a sharing mechanism 
of revenues from the non-consumptive operations in WMAs, stating that ‘5% shall be directed 
to the District Council, 25% to the Director of Wildlife and 70% to Authorised Associations’ 
[36]. Non-consumptive utilisation includes game viewing and other ecotourism investments 
in WMAs including tourist lodges and hotels. Likewise, the WMA Regulations Section 48 (8) 
states that ‘the income generated from resident hunting in WMAs shall be shared as follows: 
(a) Authorised Association 40%; (b) responsible District Council 60%’ [13, 31]. Moreover, the 
Twelfth Schedule of the WMA Regulations provides a table showing how benefits from tour-
ist hunting in the WMAs should be shared. The benefits are shared between the Tanzania 
Wildlife Protection Fund (TWPF) unit in the Wildlife Division, the Wildlife Management Area 
(WMA), the District Council (DC) and the Treasury (TR) as shown in Table 4.
Furthermore, the 2012 WMA Regulations Section17 (e) [13] authorises the central government 
to determine the level of benefits local communities get from WMAs. The Regulations state 
that Village Councils will be responsible for ‘approving the mechanism for benefit sharing 
among the villages forming the Wildlife Management Area in accordance with guidelines 
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Fiscal Year WMA gross 
revenue1
Village Councils’ 
share2
WMA expenses Authorised Association’s 
surplus
Each Village Council Number of villages3
2006/7 37,496,988 18,748,494 8,296,411 10,452,083 2,083,166 9
2007/8 75,256,890 37,628,445 24,243,022 13,385,423 4,703,556 8
2008/9 64,595,376 32,297,688 34,211,010 −1,913,322 3,588,632 9
2009/10 227,618,815 113,809,407 101,338,183 12,471,224 11,380,941 10
2010/11 391,459,764 195,729,882 150,325,192 45,404,690 19,572,988 10
2011/12 473,738,860 236,869,429 175,940,789 60,928,640 26,318,825 9
2012/13 275,430,040 137,715,020 163,041,379 −25,326,359 13,771,502 10
2013/14 412,593,089 206,296,544 175,515,558 30,780,987 20,629,654 10
2014/15 820,954,000 410,472,500 290,810,232 119,662,268 41,047,250 10
2015/16 795,272,230 397,636,115 383,923,203 13,712,912 39,763,611 10
2016/17 1,268,810,655 634,405,327 460,869,316 173,536,011 63,440,533 10
2017/18 2,071,861,968 1,035,930,984 655,882,294 380,048,690 103,593,098 10
Sum 6,915,088,674 3,457,539,835 2,624,396,589 833,143,246
Average per 
year
69,428,604 29,157,813
1After the deduction of shares to the Tanzania Wildlife Protection Fund, the District Council and the Treasury (see below).
2Village Councils are entitled to 50% of the WMA gross revenue as per legal regulation.
3In 2006/7–2008/9, the total number of villages was nine as Kakoi village was formed in 2009/10. As part of Minjingu village’s struggle to pull out of Burunge WMA, its 
share in 2007/8 and 2011/12 was used by the Authorised Association to fund a secondary school project.
Source: field data.
Table 3. Burunge WMA revenue collection and distribution (current TZS).
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issued by the Government from time to time’ [12, 13]. Section 66 (1 and 2) further elaborates 
on benefit sharing mechanisms at the Authorised Association and village level: ‘(1) benefit-
sharing in Wildlife Management Areas shall comply with circulars issued by the government 
from time to time. (2) Authorised Association shall ensure that: (a) at least 15% of its annual 
gross revenue is re-invested for resource development; (b) at least 50% of its annual gross rev-
enue is directed to villages forming part of the Wildlife Management Area and (c) at least 25% 
of its annual gross revenue is used to strengthen the Authorised Association’. This distribution 
leaves out 10% of the revenues. Interviews with the Authorised Association officials revealed 
that 50% of the gross revenues stay with the Authorised Association, while 50% goes to the vil-
lages forming the WMA, c.f. Table 3. According to local Wildlife Division officials, the missing 
10% from the WMA Regulations is an error in the Regulations and that revenues should be 
divided equally between the WMA forming Village Councils and the Authorised Association.
Villagers in Burunge WMA knew that their Village Councils’ share of the WMA revenue origi-
nated from their land. However, they did not know how much this amounted to in percentage 
of the total WMA revenue, and they were unaware that all Village Councils got equal shares 
irrespective of the fact that each village had contributed different areas of land to the WMA and 
some hosted tourist lodges or camps while others did not. As noted above, the group of Village 
Councils do get their minimum share, that is, 50% of the WMA revenues. However, this share 
is entirely top-down defined and then imposed on Village Councils who did not seem to have 
foreseen this loss of authority over village land revenues when they joined Burunge WMA.
Power struggles over revenue-sharing were also observed between the Village Councils and 
the Authorised Association. For example, Village Councils complained about the 50-50 share 
of revenues between them and the Authorised Association. Further, Village Council members 
argued that regardless of the amount received by the Authorised Association they did not see 
the necessity or legitimacy of dividing those revenues equally between them. For example, 
Village Council members in Minjingu and Vilima Vitatu villages claimed that since they had 
supplied more resources and land to the WMA, other villages did not deserve equally high 
shares of the WMA revenues. The size of land contributed to the WMA was 3746 ha from 
Minjingu, 12,829 ha from Vilima Vitatu, 3039 ha from Mwada, 2445 ha from Sangaiwe and 
2257 ha from Magara [27, 28].
Dissatisfaction over the rule specifying that revenues must be divided into arithmetically equal 
shares among the participating villages figures among the reasons why Minjingu village wants 
Fee TWPF WMA DC TR
Block fee 25% 75% 0 0
Game fee 25% 45% 15% 15%
Conservation fee 25% 45% 0 30%
Observers fee 25% 45% 0 30%
Permit fee 25% 15% 0 60%
Source: [13]
Table 4. Distribution of income generated from tourist hunting activities in a WMA.
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to withdraw from the WMA. Before the formation of Burunge WMA, Minjingu village had 
signed a contract with the investor who operates Maramboi Tented Camp on their village land. 
The investor started operations in September 2006, and in 2008, Minjingu village was forced to 
share that revenue with the other villages. Table 5 shows the revenues received by Minjingu 
village from Maramboi Tented Camp in 2006 and 2007 before the investor was required to pay 
the Authorised Association instead of Minjingu village. Due to this and claims by Minjingu vil-
lage that it did not willingly accept joining the WMA, Minjingu Village Council sued the inves-
tor and the Authorised Association in 2014. During the conflict, Minjingu village continued to 
demand its revenues from the investor who was paying first to the Authorised Association, and 
since 2012, to the Wildlife Division, c.f. above. At the same time, Minjingu occasionally refused 
to accept its shares of revenues from the Authorised Association, c.f. Table 3. Therefore, to 
prevent anger and frustration among villagers, the investor had to renegotiate his position and 
contribute to village development activities in Minjingu over and above previously agreed 
annual payments that went to the Authorised Association and subsequently to the central gov-
ernment. This enabled the investor to stay in business but reduced his profit margin.
Benefit-sharing programmes that do not address problems at the household level are 
likely to become unpopular no matter how much money is injected into them [38]. 
Unfortunately, costs in the form of wildlife causing crop damages and restrictions on 
traditional uses of resources within areas set aside for the WMA rather than benefits 
have materialised at the household level in Burunge WMA [39]. Nevertheless, the WMA 
Regulations Section 17 (e) specifies that the central government is mandated to determine 
the share of generated benefits that local communities are to receive from village land 
investments [13]. This clearly contradicts Section 26 of the Local Government District 
Authorities Act No. 7 of 1982 that mandates Village Councils to be corporate bodies, 
which are free to earn benefits from investments on their land and to determine how to 
use the revenues for their own development [40]. In this context, however, the structural 
power of the Village Councils cannot override the strategic and institutional powers pos-
sessed by the Authorised Association, the District Council and the Wildlife Division. This 
imbalance is bound to cause conflicts.
3.3.2. Power struggles over the management of Burunge WMA
The general narrative presented to Village Councils in Burunge WMA suggested that the deci-
sion to set aside part of their village lands for conservation under a WMA would not affect 
their control over these lands. However, the strategic powers that the Authorised Association 
Year Revenue from Maramboi Tented Camp directly to Minjingu 
village
WMA revenue to each of the other 
villages
2006 11,198,479 2,083,166
2007 40,511,101 4,703,556
Sources: [37]
Table 5. Revenues received by Minjingu and the other WMA villages in 2006 and 2007 before the investor was required 
to pay the Authorised Association in current TZS.
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share with the District Council and the Wildlife Division has largely made it the, de facto, 
governing body of the WMA area. Even though the villagers officially form it, the Authorised 
Association distanced itself from the communities and acted mostly in the interest of outsid-
ers. The WMA Regulations’ Section 17(a) states that village councils shall ‘provide land for 
the designation and establishment of a Wildlife Management Area’ [13]. Accordingly, Vilima 
Vitatu’s Village Council committed 65% of its village land to the WMA during the WMA 
initiation process, that is, 12,830 ha out of 19,800 ha. Simultaneously, the village population 
increased from 1,323 in 2003 to 3,281 people in 2014. Therefore, the village wanted to reclaim 
part of its land from the WMA to offer livelihood opportunities to its citizens. That, how-
ever, proved to be far from straightforward. The WMA Regulations Section 37(a) states that a 
WMA will cease to exist when there is ‘a change of use in the Village Land Use Plan’ [13, 26]. 
However, since WMAs are formed by many villages, one or several of these are not free to 
independently change the status of the part of their land that falls within the WMA. The 
WMA Regulations are silent on what should happen in a situation where one or several vil-
lages change their land use plan and continues to be party to the WMA, but Kicheleri et al. [15] 
found that when a WMA is gazetted, the land within the WMA appears to change legal status 
from village land to reserved land. Thus, if Village Councils like that of Vilima Vitatu want to 
modify their land-use plan, they wake up to a realisation that they have lost control over, the 
part that falls within the WMA. Meanwhile, the WMAs generate substantial revenues from 
different investment ventures. As mentioned, 50% of these revenues are controlled by the 
Authorised Association, not the Village Councils. Hence, although Village Councils hold de 
jure institutional power, the WMA institutional arrangement severely limits their control over 
WMA revenues (strategic power), thereby undermining their relevance to their constituen-
cies among whom many feel under-compensated for losses they have suffered because of 
Burunge WMA. Adding pain to injury, the Authorised Association leaders are, in comparison 
to Village Council leaders, paid generous allowances to attend meetings and workshops in 
different parts of the country which makes their positions more prestigious and financially 
attractive than those of Village Council leaders.
An interview with the Wildlife Division officials regarding the management of WMAs 
revealed that the central government’s approach was to progressively build the capacity 
of Authorised Associations to fill their roles. Nevertheless, Village Council members from 
the study villages claimed that the Authorised Association had thus far failed to commu-
nicate its mandate and obligations to local communities. These findings correspond with 
those of Kicheleri et al. [15] who found noncompliance with WMA Regulations by Burunge 
Authorised Association, which failed to hold meetings with villagers. Village Councils and 
the Authorised Association both hold institutional power, but they differ in the sense that 
Village Councils have structural power over the people, while the Authorised Association 
has strategic power (money). Hence, including Village Councils in Authorised Association 
meetings could challenge the latter’s strategic power. Formally, nothing prevents Village 
Councils from seeking such influence, but information gaps and lack of clear communication 
channels among the WMA actors have thus far prevented this from happening in a struc-
tured manner, which is a major cause of frustrations and conflicts [41].
In short, Burunge WMA has, contrary to its official objective, attenuated the democratically 
elected Village Councils’ powers over their village lands as well as their power over revenue 
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streams from such lands. Village Councils lost their original authority over land and revenue 
to a newly created and supposedly democratic institution, the Authorised Association, which 
has subsequently lost part of its authority over WMA revenues to the Wildlife Division and 
District Councils. Notably, this followed a ‘rule through law’ process the dangers and conse-
quences of which Village Councils did not realise before it was too late. Intended or not, this 
looks like ‘divide and rule’ tactics by the central government to re-centralise while decentral-
ising wildlife governance. Following Ribot’s [16] definition of democratic decentralisation: 
The transfer of meaningful powers over resources and associated revenue streams from the centre to 
responsive, representative, and downwardly accountable local institutions, Burunge WMA has done 
the exact opposite vis á vis Village Councils.
3.3.3. Power struggles over accessing and using resources
The establishment of Burunge WMA has imposed opportunity costs on local communities by 
prohibiting their access to natural resources such as water, thatching grasses, building poles, 
dry season grazing areas, firewood and Doum Palm (Hyphaene compressa). However, extrac-
tion of some resources such as firewood was allowed on special occasions such as burial cer-
emonies. Bluwstein et al. [14] reported a similar situation as well as the resulting resistance 
from local communities within Burunge. In this respect, Kakoi village is a good example. Here, 
people applauded the idea of establishing the WMA following a verbal promise by the Wildlife 
Division’s representative that the villagers’ access to dry season fodders within the WMA area 
would be maintained. However, unknown to the villagers at that time, plans for tourist hunt-
ing in the very same area were also under development. This may explain villagers’ subsequent 
claim that they were hardly involved in the detailed and formalised processes of develop-
ing a management plan to legally establish Burunge WMA, c.f. Kicheleri et al. [15]. Village 
Assemblies and Councils were involved during the sensitisation process but excluded during 
the preparation of the Management Zone Plan and General Management Plan for the WMA. As 
mentioned, the official recognition of the WMA area as well as the Authorised Association’s 
authority to manage it is contingent on the Wildlife Director’s official endorsement of the 
Management Zone Plan, which identifies areas for specific uses and set limitations on other 
forms of use depending on the purpose and sensitivity of the resources. Unsurprisingly, tourist 
hunting turned out to be incompatible with local resource uses due to risks of accidental inju-
ries or casualties and disturbance of the wildlife targeted for hunting. Accordingly, when the 
investor complained to the Authorised Association that villagers’ collection of fodder and graz-
ing of livestock impacted his tourist hunting business negatively, the Authorised Association 
decided to criminalise these activities through a revision of the WMA Management Zone Plan. 
So, on the (verbal) promise of continued access to key resources, the people of Kakoi village 
were mobilised to support the establishment of Burunge Authorised Association, which subse-
quently used its legally defined authority to deny people access to these very resources.
3.4. Conflict management in Burunge WMA
Power struggles have fuelled numerous conflicts in Burunge WMA. However, our respon-
dents in the four case villages distinguished between ‘conflicts’, which they identified as 
situations where conflicts of interests led to open confrontations and ‘problems’, which they 
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identified as circumstances that had made villagers’ lives harder but not led to open confron-
tations. Rules on rights to land and environmental resource use were identified as the source 
of conflicts among pastoralists, the investor (Maramboi and Burunge Tented Camps) and the 
Authorised Association (Table 6). The conflicts were primarily over access to grazing areas 
and fodder. Frequently these conflicts were associated with problems of access to (potential) 
agricultural land, water, building poles, firewood, and thatching grass as grazing lands pro-
vide these opportunities and environmental products too.
Table 6 illustrates that most (74%) of the interviewed households stated that conflicts existed 
within the WMA all of which were over land-use and involved pastoralists, investors and the 
Authorised Association. The Authorised Association was involved in all conflicts because, 
since the establishment of the WMA, all investors are answerable to it and not to the respec-
tive Village Councils.
Kakoi, which is a rather new village established in 2009, has had land use conflicts over fodder 
with the Authorised Association since its initiation. On many occasions, villagers from Kakoi 
cited the separation of Kakoi from Minjingu Village, which wants to pull out of the WMA, as 
equal to the German divide and rule tactics during the colonial era. With the assistance of district offi-
cials, it was possible to establish Kakoi village and persuade villagers to join the WMA. Although 
this tactic was successful, it has not ended land use conflicts. These findings support Neumann 
[42] and Fairhead [43] who assert that land use conflicts are ubiquitous in CBNRM in Africa. 
However, this was not expected in the WMA context as CBNRM programme principles aim at 
giving local communities more rights to resources and associated revenues as well as rights and 
opportunities to manage conflicts, compared to ‘fence-and-fine’ conservation approaches [44].
This study also uncovered several problems that villagers perceived were directly related to 
the WMA and the Authorised Association. Villagers claimed that crop raiding had increased 
since the WMA was established. As described by a man in Kakoi village: ‘… the elephants 
come in a herd at night before raiding a pumpkin farm. A few would come close to the farm and walk 
around. When they realise there is no danger, they will give a trumpeting that will call the rest of the 
herd into the farm’. Villagers complained about lack of compensation following crop raids. 
Likewise, fishermen claimed that the Authorised Association had taken over the responsibil-
ity of the Beach Management Unit (BMU) [45] denying them their livelihoods, where in real-
ity the BMU should have been run by the communities. They further accused the Authorised 
Association of assuming control over Burunge Lake.
Villagers also accused investors of fuelling conflicts in Burunge WMA, presumably due to 
the inherent conflict potential of their conflicting land-use interests. Thus far, none of the 
Village Total Mean Percentage
Mwada Vilima Vitatu Minjingu Kakoi
15 25 30 34 104 26 74
Source: household interviews (n = 140).
Table 6. Land-use conflicts involving pastoralists, investors and the Authorised Association.
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identified conflicts between the District Council, the Wildlife Division, Village Councils and 
the Authorised Association have been resolved. The strategic power (money) possessed by 
investors in the WMA made villagers claim that the investors bribed officials of the Authorised 
Association and the District Council to disregard villagers’ interests in their village land. For 
instance, respondents claimed that when they report an incident to the said officials, they tend 
to team up and visit the investors before calling a resolution meeting with the villagers. The 
District Council and Authorised Association officials denied these allegations.
No specific participatory and transparent mechanisms to manage and resolve conflicts within 
Burunge WMA exist. Instead, actors use different means and ways to push their agendas. For 
example, villagers report conflicts to the Village Councils or the Village Executive Secretary. 
The Village Councils report conflicts to the Authorised Association or the Babati District 
Council. The Authorised Association reports conflicts to the Babati District Police and Wildlife 
Division, while the investors report conflicts to the Authorised Association, District Council 
and the Police. Also, some villagers deal with problems simply by extracting products in con-
travention of the WMA rules, that is, through everyday forms of resistance. This multitude of 
approaches to deal with conflicts and diverging interests is rather bewildering and contrary 
to the recommendations of, for example, FAO [46], according to which participatory mecha-
nisms for conflict management are critical for successful natural resources management.
4. Conclusion and recommendations
In the management of Burunge WMA, actors had different types of power and to some degree 
diverging interests, which features among the major causes of resource conflicts and power 
struggle between the key actors: the Village Assemblies, Village Councils, Babati District Council, 
NGOs, TANAPA and the Wildlife Division [47, 48]. Overall, Village Councils, the pre-WMA 
existing village-level democratic institutions, lost powers over their village lands and associ-
ated revenue streams-mainly to the Authorised Association but also to the Wildlife Division. All 
other actors held and gained, via legislative and management rule revisions (rule through rather 
than the rule of law), strategic and institutional powers that enabled them to influence WMA 
management decisions and dominate village citizens’ interests. Thus, and quite contrary to its 
official objectives, Burunge WMA has de-democratised wildlife governance by undermining 
the importance and relevance of Village Councils to their constituencies. Investors had strate-
gic powers (money) that enabled them to survive amid struggles and conflicts that inevitably 
involved their business interests. NGOs’ strategic and institutional powers enabled them to 
promote their conservation interests. Specifically, power struggles among the actors were about 
the generation and distribution of costs and benefits, which resulted from the WMA rules and 
regulations. Due to power struggles, conflicts emerged over the access to and use of WMA 
resources. However, conflict management mechanisms pertinent to the WMA were absent.
Consequently, this study recommends that institutional powers must be returned to the 
Village Councils, whose responsibilities include all aspects of their constituencies’ liveli-
hoods. Accordingly, Authorised Associations must be formed by, not in addition to, the group 
of Village Councils that have set aside parts of their village lands to form a WMA. Based on 
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the fundamental principle that WMAs should always be more profitable to Village Councils 
than realistic alternative uses of their village lands, such new Associations (authorised by 
the Village Councils as well as the Wildlife Division) should collect and redistribute WMA 
revenues. Relevant district-level and state-level actors should also get a share if and only if 
this does not violate the above principle. Accordingly, legislative amendments must secure 
individual Village Councils permanent and widely defined rights to withdraw from WMAs. 
Also, the group of Village Councils that contribute land to a WMA should hold legal rights 
to dissolve the WMA. Both instances must result in the reinstatement of Village Councils’ 
pre-WMA rights to their village lands and related resources. Such legal rights of Village 
Councils to pull out of or dissolve a WMA would fundamentally change the current economic 
incentive structure. First, if the WMA yields an overall income that surpasses the sum of 
perceived net benefits from realistic alternatives, then the group of Village Councils would 
face a strong incentive to negotiate viable short- and long-term compromises for governing 
the WMA including how to spend and share common funds among them. Second, the central 
government, conservation NGOs and potential donors would face a compelling incentive to 
uphold the moral justification for WMAs: that they remain the most attractive land use for 
rural communities—in practice, not just potentially or in theory.
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